For the purposes of this article it is therefore necessary to identify the following: the specific rights involved with the research topic; the scope of these rights; the application of the Bill of Rights; and the interpretation thereof; if these rights are justifiably limited under the current legislation; and if these rights can be justifiably limited in terms of proposed amendments to the current legislation and any other aspects relevant thereto. In doing this it is important to keep in mind that the provisions in the Constitution have in many cases deliberately been formulated very 18 There are basically two methods of harvesting organs from prisoners. The first is to procure organs from deceased prisoners before the bodies are released to family members. The second method involves rewarding prisoners who are also organ donors, thus reducing a prison sentence in response to donation. See Ryan 2009 MSU J Med & L 433. 19 Hereinafter "the Constitution". broadly, 25 thus leaving the interpretation thereof to the courts and academics. The
Constitution thus doesn't interpret itself and the interpretation of its provisions largely lies with the interpreter thereof.
This article thus proceeds to deal with the application, limitation and interpretation of the rights in the Bill of Rights. Thereafter, each of the applicable rights is discussed separately with reference to legislation where applicable, considering the scope, interpretation and possible limitation of the specific right. A discussion of the development of relevant case law and its consequences is also included.
The application of the Bill of Rights
Before one can look at the different individual rights in the Bill of Rights, one must have an understanding of when the Bill of Rights will be applicable. Section 8 of the Constitution inter alia states that the Bill of Rights is applicable to all law, and binding on the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.
26
Section 8 further states that the common law must be applied and developed to the extent that legislation does not give effect to a right in the Bill of Rights.
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It is important to note that the modes of application of the Bill of Rights can be categorised into various groups. A right can be applied either directly or indirectly, 28 vertically between the state and an individual, or horizontally between individuals. 29, 30 The Bill of Rights is binding on the legislature, the executive, the 25 For instance s 11 of the Constitution, which states succinctly that: "Everyone has the right to life". In the context of socio-economic rights, these are the organs of state involved with and influenced by medical law, together with the legislature. This brings us to the second fact that deserves further discussion: the fact that the Bill of Rights is also binding on the legislature. 36 If any legislation does not comply with the Bill of Rights, it must be declared invalid, according to section 172(1) of the Constitution. 37 This has the consequence that legislation can be tested against the Bill of Rights, and if found inconsistent with the Constitution it will consequently be declared invalid.
When it comes to considering the validity of an organ procurement method, the Bill of Rights will therefore be applied horizontally between the state and individuals, to determine if the state has complied with its duties. This is of particular importance in 30 In Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) 861 the court explained the difference between the vertical and horizontal application of the Bill of Rights: "The term 'vertical application' is used to indicate that the rights conferred on persons by a bill of rights are intended only as a protection against the legislative and executive powers of the state in its various manifestations. The term 'horizontal application' on the other hand indicates that those rights also govern the relationships between individuals, and may be invoked by them in their private law disputes." 31 S 8(1) of the Constitution. Cheadle is of the opinion that "all law" for the purposes of s 8(1) includes legislation, common law rules, and customary law. Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law 3-10, 3-15. 32 S 8(2) of the Constitution.
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S 8(4) of the Constitution. Cheadle states that the primary function of a constitution is to both empower and restrain the state in various aspects. Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law 3-2.
34
Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law 3-15. 35 S 213 of the Constitution.
36
S 8(1) of the Constitution.
37
S 172(1) of the Constitution states that: "When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court-(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and (b) may make any order that is just and equitable…" the light of section 27(2), which places a duty of progressive realisation of certain rights on the state, a duty which will be discussed below. 38 For the purposes of this article, as it deals primarily with the current legislation regarding methods of organ procurement, as well as the lack thereof, together with possible amendments that will have to be tested against the Constitution and enforced by the Department of Health and hospitals, the Bill of Rights will almost always be applicable.
3
The limitation clause 39 The limitation clause makes provision for the rights in the Bill of Rights to be limited.
However, to be a valid limitation, a list of requirements must be met. To find the answer to this question one must look for law that either permits the action in question or confirms the lack of a prohibition against the action. This would be in accordance with a basic legal principle: when legislation does not provide for certain situations, one must always return to the provisions of the common law. It is important to keep in mind that courts must apply or if necessary develop the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to the applicable right.
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It is possible, however, to make the argument that using a common law defence such as volenti non fit injuria to justify the limitation of rights is in fact law of general application. Consequently this would in fact fall within the scope of the limitation clause. This is in line with the beginning of section 36(1), which states that: "The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of…" 45 It thus seems that the only valid limitation of rights in the Bill of Rights will be in terms of law of general application, which includes legislation, the common law and customary law. Rights, but also of requiring that the restriction must also be able to achieve its purpose, and that no other realistic solution exists that is able to achieve the same purpose without the limitation or by means of a lesser limitation. The limitation of organ procurement methods to one method that has been proven to be ineffective also needs to be tested against the limitation clause. 53 The limitation of each of the specific rights will be addressed further in paragraphs 5.5.1-5.5.6, dealing with the applicable rights in the Bill of Rights on an individual basis.
The interpretation of the Bill of Rights
In order to ascertain the meaning of a provision in the Constitution, the provision needs to be interpreted according to the rules of interpretation. 59 and that the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights must be promoted when dealing with legislation, the common law or customary law. 60 Ultimately, the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is the task of the judiciary, and more specifically the judges of the Constitutional Court, as the cases appear before them.
Specific rights
There are various constitutionally entrenched rights that are specifically important in the context of organ transplants and, more specifically, methods of organ procurement. The writers thus proceed to deal with each of these applicable rights separately, considering the scope, interpretation and possible limitation of each specific right. Relevant case law and the development thereof are also discussed, and the significance thereof is pointed out. Consequently the influence of the Constitution on organ procurement is discussed under each paragraph respectively.
Equality 61
Section 9(1) of the Constitution states that " [e] veryone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit from the law". This section is extremely Furthermore, section 9(1) places everyone as equal before the law and gives everyone the right to equal protection and benefit from the law. Any legislation thus enacted by the legislature must allow for the equal benefit of the rights contained therein and make provision to achieve the realisation of these rights. 66 Even if legislation makes provision for organ donation without prima facie discriminating against a specific group, it might still not comply with section 9(1). This is indeed the case with the current organ procurement system, opting-in, 67 as it is unsuccessful in obtaining enough organs to meet the required demand. 68 Therefore, although there is currently legislation 69 making provision for organ donation, as it does not have the ability to provide enough organs to meet the demand, it cannot satisfy the requirements of equal protection and equal benefit as set out in section 9(1). It is
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The Preamble of the Constitution states that South Africans are "united in our diversity".
64
To give effect to s 9, the Promotion of Equality 
77
S 10 thus describes dignity in two ways: firstly, as inherent to all human beings, and secondly, as an enforceable right. "However much the right to dignity may suffer infringement in an imperfect world, the inherent dignity that everyone has cannot be destroyed." Ackermann Human Dignity 95. intrinsic worth is the key to fully understand the concept of human dignity. 78 To Ackermann:
[t]he human worth (dignity) of each and every person is the capacity for and the right to respect as a human being… which in turn separate humans from the impersonality of nature, enables them to exercise their own judgment, to have selfawareness and a sense of self-worth, to exercise self-determination, to shape themselves and nature, to develop their personalities and to strive for self-fulfilment in their lives. She considers human dignity to be a value that possibly informs all other rights and also as significant in the limitations analysis. More than a mere value, human dignity is also a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected and protected.
Where the value of human dignity is offended, the primary constitutional breach may indeed be that of a specific right.
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Defining the term dignity is much harder than establishing its importance. The five primary objectives of dignity, as identified by Woolman, are: 1) individual as an end-inherself; 2) equal concern and equal respect; 3) self-actualisation; 4) self-governance and 5) collective responsibility for the material condition of agency. Woolman Constitutional Law 36-7, 36-10-12, 36-14. 95 Woolman Constitutional Law 36-11. This facet of human dignity therefore allows the individual to act autonomously. Section 10, however, makes it plain that dignity is not only a value fundamental to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected and protected. In many cases, however, where the value of human dignity is offended, the primary Constitutional breach occasioned may be of a more specific right such as the right to bodily integrity… 109 This indicates that both in general, and more specifically in the context of medical law, if the infringement could be addressed under another right, that is how it should be done, and dignity will then function only as a value that informs the right,
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The notion of inherent dignity is an important one, as it reaffirms that every human being has intrinsic worth. stated that the court's obligation to develop the common law is not discretionary, and that the courts have a "general obligation" to develop the common law where necessary. 114 The court went so far as to say that courts might in certain circumstances be obliged to raise this matter on their own. 115 Furthermore, the values in the Constitution must "guide the development of all areas of law". 116 The most significant finding of the court was that there rests a positive duty on the state to protect the rights in sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Constitution.
117 Merely refraining from infringing these rights would therefore not always be sufficient.
118
The state must actively protect the rights to dignity, life, freedom, and the security of the person.
As can be seen from the discussion under the right to life in terms of section 11, 119 the rights to life and human dignity are intertwined and dependent on one another. organs could result in denying individuals the right to dignity and compromising their right to life. In the context of organ transplantation, and more specifically organ procurement, human dignity is thus one of the most important rights to adhere to. It is important that the process of organ transplantation as a whole needs to be dignified. Every step taken in the process needs to respect the various role-player's right to dignity. This means that the method of organ procurement, the consent needed, the manner in which consent is obtained, the allocation procedures, the harvesting method, the care and treatment provided after the transplant has been completed, and any other action relevant to organ transplants need to be performed in a manner as that is as dignified as is possible. This is in line with one of the requirements for the valid limitation of any right in terms of section 36, namely that less restrictive means to achieve the purpose must at least have been considered in order for a constitutionally entrenched right to be limited justifiably. The right to life is, in one sense, antecedent to all the other rights in the Constitution. Without life in the sense of existence, it would not be possible to exercise rights or to be the bearer of them. But the right to life was included in the Constitution not simply to enshrine the right to existence. It is not life as mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, but the right to human life: the right to live as a human being, to be part of a broader community, to share in the experience of humanity. This concept of human life is at the centre of our constitutional values. The constitution seeks to establish a society where the individual value of each member of the community is recognised and treasured. The right to life is central to such a society. The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than existence, it is a right to be treated as a For instance, the rights to dignity and privacy are respected and protected even after death in the form of doctor-patient confidentiality.
human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially diminished.
Without life, there cannot be dignity. This was recognised by the Hungarian constitutional court in the case in which it considered the constitutionality of the death penalty:
It is the -untouchability and equality contained in the right to human dignity that results in man's right to life being a specific right to human life (over and above animals' and artificial subjects' right to being); on the other hand, dignity as a fundamental right does not have meaning for the individual if he or she is dead. ... Human dignity is a naturally accompanying quality of human life.'… The importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be overemphasised.
Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern.
132 The right to life, then, as enshrined in the Constitution, involves much more than merely the right to existence. According to Justice O'Regan, life must be dignified life. It is thus not life as the absence of death (as when a person is in a persistent vegetative state) that the Constitution cherishes, but the right to live as a human being, being part of a community, being able to share in the experience of humanity, that is the goal. Interaction with the world around us is thus the key to having a dignified life, and the right to being treated with respect and concern is included in the right to human dignity. Woolman contends that section 11 read with section 7(2) not only provides a safeguard against killing or the diminution of life, but also imposes positive obligations on the state to protect life. 136 These positive obligations include inter alia the duty of the state to enact legislation to preserve life where possible. Changing the current organ procurement system to a more effective one would consequently both promote and protect the right to life. Refusing to change the current organ procurement method results in directly denying individuals a chance of life.
The right to life prima facie involves preserving life whenever and wherever possible.
It is one of the most important rights in the Bill of Rights, as life is a pre-requisite for the enjoyment of all the other rights in the Bill of Rights. Although dying is a part of life, and seen as the completion of life rather than the opposite thereof, 137 it is human nature to extend and hold on to life as long as possible. Where there are lifesaving treatments available, it is against human nature to let a person die due to a lack of resources. Yet this is the reality in which we currently live. In practice patient autonomy is achieved by obtaining informed consent from the patient before any action is taken. 142 Informed consent is thus in many ways inseparable from patient autonomy, and thus also from the right to the freedom and security of the person, which are in no way new concepts in South African law. In addition to autonomy's being protected in s 12 (2) Is the organ alienated form your body once you give permission to donate, when the organ is removed, or after it has been transplanted? Basically, the question comes down to how long after removal from the body should one have control over one's body parts. The answer would also be important to determining the last point at which permission to donate could be revoked. This question has been addressed neither by the legislature nor by the courts. However, it is bound to surface within the foreseeable future.
Something that is noteworthy is a particular defence, volenti non fit iniuria, stating that no harm can be done to someone that consents thereto. The rights to freedom and the security of the person are inextricably woven together with patient autonomy and informed consent, and together they form the basis of medical law. It is therefore simply logical that patient autonomy and informed consent should play a vital role in organ procurement law, and that any organ procurement should be compliant to the above. Based on the right to freedom and security of the person, any proposed organ procurement method will therefore need to adhere to patient autonomy by utilising informed consent, in order to adhere to the Constitution. "Because to take away a man's freedom of choice, even his freedom to make the wrong choice, is to manipulate him as though he were a puppet and not a person." 156 Consequently, organ procurement by means of presumed consent or procurement from prisoners is entirely irreconcilable with section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution. Organ procurement methods such as opting-in or required response, and possibly also the sale of organs, however, supports and promotes the right to freedom and security of the person.
Privacy 157
The right to privacy enables an individual to live free from interference from others and is of specific importance in medical and health care law. Langa DP 159 states that "privacy is a right which becomes more intense the closer it moves to the personal sphere of the life of human beings, and less intense as it moves away from that core". From this quote it is clear that when dealing with any privacy issue related to healthcare, health and the life of a person, privacy must be given very high priority. 160 It is submitted that this also holds true for the methods of organ procurement. When legislation does not provide individuals with adequate access to transplantable organs, the right to privacy of choice is denied by the legislature.
O'Regan J and Sachs J summarise the Bernstein 161 judgment as follows in Jordan:
In Bernstein, Ackermann J held that the right to privacy in the interim Constitution must be understood as recognising a continuum of privacy rights which may be regarded as starting with a wholly inviolable inner self, moving to a relatively impervious sanctum of the home and personal life, and ending in a public realm where privacy would only remotely be implicated, if at all… There can be no doubt that autonomy to make decisions in relation to intensely significant aspects of one's personal life are encompassed by the term.
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This ties in with the previous quote from Hyundai Motor Distributors, in the sense that the closer to the personal sphere, the more important privacy becomes, and thus the harder it becomes to limit the right. Limiting privacy in the public sphere versus limiting privacy in the private sphere was considered extensively in S v Jordan:
Commercial sex involves the most intimate of activity taking place in the most impersonal and public of realms, the market place; it is simultaneously all about sex and all about money… A prohibition on commercial sex, therefore, will not ordinarily encroach upon intimate or meaningful human relationships. Yet it will intrude upon the intensely personal sphere of sexual intercourse, albeit intercourse for reward. Here it can be seen that there can be conflicting issues when it comes to limiting privacy. It is submitted that the same will hold true for the argument relating to the sale human kidneys. The sale of human kidneys can be seen as a purely commercial transaction: goods are supplied in exchange for money. On the other hand, however, the goods in this scenario are pieces of a person's body, an organ that only one person has autonomy over. As Currie and De Waal 164 state: "This is a difficult opposition to mediate: the intimacy of the transaction would suggest that it is at the core of privacy while its mercantile aspects would put it in the public domain."
In the context of organ transplants, there are a number of conflicting legislative instruments pertaining to privacy. There is the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 that grants the right to access to information and has the goal to "actively promote a society in which the people of South Africa have effective access to information to enable them to more fully exercise and protect all of their rights". 
Health care 166
Section 27 specifies the various rights pertaining to health care and embodies socalled socio-economic rights. 167 There are, however, also other socio-economic rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, such as section 26 of the Constitution, which relates to housing. As these rights themselves have inherent similarities, for the purpose of this discussion reference will also be made to judgments on other socio-economic rights where applicable under the current heading.
Section 27(1) of the Constitution states that "[e]veryone has the right to have access to… health care services" and section 27(2) required the state to "…take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights".
Section 27 is important as it gives effect to the ethical principle of beneficence. 168 In Soobramoney the Constitutional Court had to interpret section 27 of the Constitution. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: The Appellant in this case was a diabetic suffering from ischaemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease, as well as irreversible chronic renal failure. Due to the fact that the applicant was not free of significant vascular or cardiac disease, he was not eligible for a kidney transplant, and according to the Addington hospital policies and guidelines, therefore also not eligible for regular renal dialysis. The duty of the State regarding organ transplantation and the availability of resources for organ transplants was not discussed further in this case, as the Appellant was not eligible for a transplant due to medical reasons.
The court pointed out that the obligations imposed on the state by section 27 are "…dependent upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of resources".
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The court also stated that:
Some rights in the Constitution are the ideal and something to be strived for. They amount to a promise, in some cases, and an indication of what a democratic society aiming to salvage lost dignity, freedom and equality should embark upon. They are values which the Constitution seeks to provide, nurture and protect for a future South Africa. However, the guarantees of the Constitution are not absolute but may be limited in one way or another. In some instances, the Constitution states in so many words that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources 'to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.'
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This clearly shows that in certain cases the court will value the wellbeing of a collective group higher than that of an individual, due to the limitation of section 27(1) by section 27(2 199 However, the question remains whether or not the Act has achieved the standard of a reasonable legislative measure as required by section 27(2). It is the authors' submission that the National Health Act does not meet the standard of a reasonable legislative measure with regards to organ transplantation law, as required by section 27(2). Venter raises the possibility that there might be a duty on the state to find alternative options if a specific resource has been limited for a number of years.
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In casu, it is submitted that the state has a duty to find alternative measures to alleviate the constant organ shortage, by replacing the current organ procurement system of opting-in with a more suitable method of organ procurement. 201 The Court in Port Elizabeth rightly held that that our entire society is demeaned when government action denies citizens' basic needs. 
Conclusion
This article has investigated the constitutional influences on organ transplantation law, with specific reference to organ procurement methods. One of the main factors that has to be kept in mind when considering legal development is that the law can take a long time to change, it is conservative, and often a few years behind society's perspectives on morality and the law.
However, there is a duty whenever new law is enacted or when existing law is amended, interpreted or limited to do so in a manner that protects and promotes the values underlying an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
Each of the rights applicable to this study in the Bill of Rights was examined specifically in the light of the research topic. The scope and application of the limitation clause were also examined to determine whether and to what extent an individual can limit his or her own rights. What is clear from the study is that many of the rights in the Bill of Rights are intertwined and cannot be read in isolation.
They inform one another and must thus be looked at together to form an overall picture.
When considering any right in the Bill of Rights a comprehensive and complex study is required. There are many issues that deserve proper consideration: the application of the right, the meaning or content of the right, the interpretation of the right, other existing law, whether it be in the form of legislation, common law, case law or ethics; the limitation of the right; in the case of dignity, equality or freedom whether it operates as a right or a fundamental value; and so forth. Establishing what the court might find in a specific case is no easy task.
Section 7(2) is applicable to all of the above rights and places a positive duty on the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights. In the context of organ transplants, this means that the state has a duty to allow people to exercise their 
